No one Needed to Die on the MV Sewol
What caused the South Korean Ferry Sewol to sink last month? It was a combination of errors.
According to Ms. Park, the 3rd Mate on watch, the MV Sewol disaster began with a steering malfunction. She reported that when the helmsman made a course correction, the rudder swung swiftly to port and wouldn't respond to further rudder commands. The helmsman, Mr. Cho, confirmed the malfunction. However, at 22 knots, a steering gear failure shouldn't cause a ship to capsize.
Next, there was a shift of the cargo and vehicles on the ferry. According to the ship's manifest there were 45 containers loaded on the deck, forward of the bridge. Photos of the Sewol taken shortly after rescue helicopters arrived show only 12 containers on deck, and none of those were firmly lashed down. The remaining 33 must have broken away and fallen over the side. Similarly, while it is impossible to see what happened to the cars and trucks on the car deck. It can be assumed that they shifted as well, because the Sewol was listing 20 degrees to port when the engines were stopped and the speed had been reduced to 5 knots.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) publishes minimum lashing standards for vehicles carried by ferry. Each truck less than 20 feet in length should have had four lashings securing the truck to the deck, two per side. Each truck over 20 feet should have had eight lashings. Had the trucks been lashed down to ISO standards, the trucks would not have shifted when the ferry made its sudden turn.
Next came human error. The Captain, instead of telling the passengers to don their life jackets and muster on deck, instead told the passengers to stay where they were below deck. He says that he was afraid that the passengers would be swept away by the strong currents, but mustering the passengers on deck, in the vicinity of the life rafts, did not require them to enter the water. The Sewol was equipped with 44 life rafts, each with a capacity for 25 people. That is 1100 spots for under 500 passengers and crew. However, only 2 of those 44 lifeboats were launched into the water.
After the passengers were told to remain below decks, the list of the ship continued to increase from 20 degrees, to 30 degrees, to 40 degrees and then to 50 degrees before the Captain himself stepped from the Sewol onto a rescue craft. In the photo showing the Captain leaving the Sewol you can also see 14 life rafts, sitting in their cradles, never having been placed into the water. The passengers were now trapped below deck.
At a list of 50 degrees there was no way for the passengers to reach the doors and hatches leading to the outside, without the use of handholds, ropes, or ladders. Their fate was sealed. They would die inside the ship, their escape route having been cut off by the list of the ship.
These were not the only errors committed by the Captain and crew of the Sewol. When the ship initially listed over to one side, the first distress signals didn't come from the crew of the Sewol. They came by cell phone from the passengers. The crew of the ship waited over 8 minutes before advising the Coast Guard of their predicament.
The tragedy on the Sewol didn't need to happen. No one needed to die. It's a shame that so many did.
According to Ms. Park, the 3rd Mate on watch, the MV Sewol disaster began with a steering malfunction. She reported that when the helmsman made a course correction, the rudder swung swiftly to port and wouldn't respond to further rudder commands. The helmsman, Mr. Cho, confirmed the malfunction. However, at 22 knots, a steering gear failure shouldn't cause a ship to capsize.
Next, there was a shift of the cargo and vehicles on the ferry. According to the ship's manifest there were 45 containers loaded on the deck, forward of the bridge. Photos of the Sewol taken shortly after rescue helicopters arrived show only 12 containers on deck, and none of those were firmly lashed down. The remaining 33 must have broken away and fallen over the side. Similarly, while it is impossible to see what happened to the cars and trucks on the car deck. It can be assumed that they shifted as well, because the Sewol was listing 20 degrees to port when the engines were stopped and the speed had been reduced to 5 knots.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) publishes minimum lashing standards for vehicles carried by ferry. Each truck less than 20 feet in length should have had four lashings securing the truck to the deck, two per side. Each truck over 20 feet should have had eight lashings. Had the trucks been lashed down to ISO standards, the trucks would not have shifted when the ferry made its sudden turn.
Next came human error. The Captain, instead of telling the passengers to don their life jackets and muster on deck, instead told the passengers to stay where they were below deck. He says that he was afraid that the passengers would be swept away by the strong currents, but mustering the passengers on deck, in the vicinity of the life rafts, did not require them to enter the water. The Sewol was equipped with 44 life rafts, each with a capacity for 25 people. That is 1100 spots for under 500 passengers and crew. However, only 2 of those 44 lifeboats were launched into the water.
After the passengers were told to remain below decks, the list of the ship continued to increase from 20 degrees, to 30 degrees, to 40 degrees and then to 50 degrees before the Captain himself stepped from the Sewol onto a rescue craft. In the photo showing the Captain leaving the Sewol you can also see 14 life rafts, sitting in their cradles, never having been placed into the water. The passengers were now trapped below deck.
At a list of 50 degrees there was no way for the passengers to reach the doors and hatches leading to the outside, without the use of handholds, ropes, or ladders. Their fate was sealed. They would die inside the ship, their escape route having been cut off by the list of the ship.
These were not the only errors committed by the Captain and crew of the Sewol. When the ship initially listed over to one side, the first distress signals didn't come from the crew of the Sewol. They came by cell phone from the passengers. The crew of the ship waited over 8 minutes before advising the Coast Guard of their predicament.
The tragedy on the Sewol didn't need to happen. No one needed to die. It's a shame that so many did.
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I have deep respect with those loosing near family and friends on board, and the people of South Korea. But in particular when in the middle of a crisis the principle of justice comes under pressure. Politicians themselves are surely under pressure in these situations, but defining the master's actions as manslaughter before a thorough investigation and / or trial for justice has taken place, makes it very difficult for him and others onboard to actually contribute to a fair investigation. South Korea have accepted SOLAS and the ISM code, thus also have a duty to control the shipping and ferry companies and their system of safety, which indeed shall include the training of evacuation. An important question to be asked, if to learn from such a tragedy is whether the crew and officers onboard where given the necessary traininng, and to which degree the company and relevant authorities actually had carried out their duty to control that the level of competence was satisfactory.
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adthisaya G. y PETER T. recomiendan estoNow, how to build a safety culture where authorities, classification societies and managememt companies build trust and cooperate properly? It is an incremental process, and also in Europe too often pushed by accidents, but both within the national aurhorities and top South Korean management companies one will find the necessary competence and understanding. Whether proper routines and control mechanisms in all levels of the industry seems to be in place must surely be further investigated. .
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Captain Cem A. y adthisaya G. recomiendan esto-
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PETER T. recomienda estoTo begin with, I hope that the local authorities everywhere around the world can implement stringent checks and controls on all coastal ships and ferries as well as foreign going vessels. Through the wide network already available, the authorities can solicit help from the maritime professionals in case they are shorthanded.
The issue SOLAS Reg 1 - Application - which suggests that ships not engaged on International trade might not need to comply with SOLAS. That of course takes us to SOLAS Ch IX and its Reg 2, following this the implication is that Pax vessels not engaged in International voyages need not apply the ISM Code. You expect of course that responsible maritime nations such as South Korea have adopted voluntary SOLAS & ISM in their Merchant Shipping Act though I confess not to have researched this aspect relevant to the case of the Sewol. May be someone has the answer. Certainly you would expect Class to approve stability designs and stability data etc based on International rules and codes etc.
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Rod S. recomienda esto